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INTRODUCTIONMY first political memory is from 1974, when I was seven years
old. I remember seeing a man on television, and to my young
mind, something did not look right. I asked my father who the
man was and what he was doing. My dad said the man was going to be
the new President: It was August 9, 1974, and Gerald Ford was taking the
oath of office of the President of the United States. I remember asking
what happened to the old President. My dad told me that the old Presi-
dent had done some bad things and so he had to give up his job. My
memory fades at that point, but my guess is that I probably said "OK"
and went back to playing with my baseball cards.
I begin with this story because it identifies an important point of refer-
ence: I came of age in the post-Watergate era, when limited and checked
executive power was the norm, and suspicion-indeed, deep suspicion-
of government officials was deemed the only prudent course. After all,
this same era spawned the Office of the Independent Counsel,' a law
barring bribery of foreign government officials, 2 and a law protecting the
privacy of personal information held by the government. 3 The lesson was
simple: When a government official says "trust me," it is best to do just
the opposite.
This contrasts sharply with the view of some in the current administra-
tion. For example, Vice President Richard Cheney, who served in the
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. This Essay extends
my remarks delivered at the conference "Guarding the Guardians: The Ethics and Law of
Domestic Surveillance," hosted by the Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Professional
Responsibility at Southern Methodist University on October 20, 2006. I thank my co-
presenters for their comments and questions on my presentation. Also, special thanks to
Professor Thomas Mayo, Director of the Maguire Center, for the invitation to participate
in the event.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 591-599 (2005).
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2005).
3. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2005).
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federal government during the pre- and post-Watergate era,4 believes
that Watergate swung the pendulum too far against executive power, arti-
ficially cabining the President. 5 Not surprisingly, this has led to rather
broad claims of executive power, such as unilateral executive power to
indefinitely detain and try foreign enemy combatants 6 and to conduct do-
mestic surveillance, 7 as well as presidential signing statements that ignore
disagreeable provisions of federal statutes. 8
Going forward, the challenge is to balance suspicion of, and confidence
in, executive power-to leave the executive flexibility to meet changing
threats, while ensuring that flexibility is not a pretext for abuse. To begin
answering this challenge, this Essay draws on expertise from an area of
private law: the design, implementation, and operation of corporate com-
pliance and ethics programs. A corporate compliance and ethics program
consists of an organization's code of conduct, policies, and procedures
that help achieve compliance with relevant laws as well as the organiza-
tion's ethical standards. 9 My thesis is that constitutional separation of
powers analysis ought to incorporate lessons from corporate compliance
and ethics programs. Separation of powers requires adequate checks and
balances to prevent abuse of federal power, and corporate compliance
4. Vice President Cheney served as President Ford's Chief of Staff. See, Vice Presi-
dent of the United States Richard B. Cheney, http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/
(last visited June 18, 2007).
5. See Michiko Kakutani, The Case Against Those Expanding White House Powers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at E32 ("[E]xpanded executive power was not a response to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 but the realization of a vision that conservatives like Dick Cheney
had harbored since the 1970s, when they grew aggrieved over post-Watergate reforms that
put the brakes on presidential power."); Tim Harper, Cheney Argues for Nixon-Era Pow-
ers: Watergate Eroded Presidential Clout; VP Comments Fuel Firestorm in U.S., TORON-10
STAR, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al ("'Watergate and a lot of things around Watergate and Viet-
nam, both during the '70s served, I think, to erode the authority ... the president needs to
be effective, especially in the national security area,' Cheney told reporters aboard the Air
Force Two aircraft after a visit to Pakistan."); Scott Shane, Behind Power, One Principle,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, at Al ("With the strong support of Vice President Dick Che-
ney, legal theorists in the White House and Justice Department have argued that previous
presidents unjustifiably gave up some of the legitimate power of their office. The attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, made it especially critical that the full power of the executive be restored
and exercised, they said."). Vice President Cheney had endorsed these same views in 1987
when, as representative of the State of Wyoming, he joined the Minority Report on the
Iran-Contra Affair. See REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, at 457-58 (1987).
6. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (addressing the Administra-
tion's argument regarding detainees that "the courts must forgo any examination of the
individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme").
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
8. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATION 14-18
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba final signing-state-
mentsrecommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf (discussing second Bush administration's use
of presidential signing statements).
9. For additional history and background on effective compliance programs, see gen-
erally Paul E. McGreal, Legal Risk Assessment After the Amended Sentencing Guidelines:
The Challenge for Small Organizations, 23 CORP. COUNS. REV. 153 (2004).
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and ethics programs have proven powerful checks on the abuse of corpo-
rate power. Corporate compliance and ethics best practices, then, can
guide analysis of whether a given exercise of federal power incorporates
adequate checks against abuse.
This Essay uses the example of domestic foreign intelligence surveil-
lance to develop its thesis. In December 2005, the New York Times re-
ported that the Bush Administration had conducted a form of domestic
surveillance, known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP"), for
about three years:10
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency
has monitored the international telephone calls and international e-
mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the
United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort
to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials
said. The agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely
domestic communications."
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales later clarified the scope of the TSP:
The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic
surveillance of a particular kind, and this would be the intercepts of
contents of communications where [. .. ] one party to the communi-
cation is outside the United States. And this is a very important
point-.., one party to the communication has to be outside the
United States. Another very important point to remember is that we
have to have a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the
communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or
a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in
support of al Qaeda....
What we're trying to do is learn of communications, back and
forth, from within the United States to overseas with members of al
Qaeda. And that's what this program is about.' 2
The Department of Justice claimed that both the President's inherent
constitutional powers and federal law authorize such surveillance without
judicial approval.' 3 After a federal district court struck down the pro-
10. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
11. Id.
12. Press Briefing, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales & General Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html. The Attorney General also
explained that his remarks related only to the surveillance program already disclosed to
the public:
The President confirmed the existence of a highly classified program on Sat-
urday. The program remains highly classified; there are many operational
aspects of the program that have still not been disclosed and we want to
protect that because those aspects of the program are very, very important to
protect the national security of this country. So I'm only going to be talking
about the legal underpinnings for what has been disclosed by the President.
Id.
13. While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires court approval
for surveillance of communications where one party is within the United States, 50 U.S.C.
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gram as violating separation of powers and the Fourth Amendment, 14 the
Bush administration agreed to seek federal court approval for future
surveillance.15
While the TSP is now defunct, it raises ongoing concerns regarding
government power and personal liberty. This Essay applies its separation
of powers thesis to these concerns: When the government conducts do-
mestic surveillance, it should protect citizen privacy by designing and im-
plementing a compliance and ethics program. Federal law already
requires many private companies that collect customer data to do so, and
this Essay simply proposes that the federal government take a dose of its
own medicine. 16
This Essay has five parts. Part I identifies the scope of the project.
Part II reviews separation of powers first principles: Any program of do-
mestic surveillance must satisfy these principles of checked and balanced
power. Part III describes the current dilemma posed by counterterror-
ism: How to collect and analyze the mass of data needed to prevent the
next terrorist attack while adequately protecting the privacy of United
States citizens? Part IV describes how corporate compliance and ethics
programs have allowed private companies to manage the risks posed by
data privacy. Part V concludes by arguing that separation of powers anal-
ysis ought to ask whether the federal government has adopted similar
compliance and ethics measures when handling data collected for surveil-
lance purposes.
I. THE SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT
This Essay discusses the intersection of three subjects: domestic surveil-
lance, separation of powers, and corporate compliance and ethics pro-
grams. The following sections briefly describe each topic.
§§ 1801- 1802 (2002), the Bush Administration has argued that Congress allowed such
surveillance by passage of the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001). See LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 2-3. For a
discussion of FISA's history and requirements, see ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW DECISIONS (Congressional Research Service
Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf.
14. A.C.L.U. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd
on other grounds, No. 06-2095, 2007 WL 1952370 (6th Cir. July 6, 2007).
15. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Hon. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and Hon. Arlen Spector, Ranking Minority Member,
Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/politics/20060117gonzalesLetter.pdf.
16. As this Essay was in the editing process, the Department of Justice Announced
that it was implementing additional internal controls over its national security activities.
See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Hon. Richard B. Cheney,
President of the Senate (July 13, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/
cheneyjletter071307.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department





The intelligence challenge posed by terrorism can be stated rather sim-
ply: Predict where and when terrorists are likely to strike so the govern-
ment can prevent future attacks. As will be discussed in Part III,
counterterrorism's preventive focus means that government often starts
without individualized suspicion, instead casting a wide intelligence net.
This net will inevitably ensnare data of United States citizens for three
main reasons. First, due to the nature of modern technology, even com-
munications between individuals outside the United States may pass
through and commingle with communications made solely within the
United States.1 7 Detection of such foreign communications necessarily
requires surveillance of the commingled domestic communications. Sec-
ond, some foreign terrorists, such as those who perpetrated the 9/11 at-
tacks, plan and attack from within the United States. And third, some
terrorist activity will be perpetrated by United States citizens, as was the
17. For example, e-mail messages travel in electronic packets that may take different
paths to their destination:
On the Internet, the network breaks an e-mail message into parts of a certain
size in bytes. These are the packets. Each packet carries the information that
will help it get to its destination-the sender's IP address, the intended re-
ceiver's IP address, something that tells the network how many packets this
e-mail message has been broken into and the number of this particular
packet.... Each packet contains part of the body of your message. A typical
packet contains perhaps 1,000 or 1,500 bytes.
Each packet is then sent off to its destination by the best available route-a
route that might be taken by all the other packets in the message or by none
of the other packets in the message. This makes the network more efficient.
First, the network can balance the load across various pieces of equipment on
a millisecond-by-millisecond basis. Second, if there is a problem with one
piece of equipment in the network while a message is being transferred,
packets can be routed around the problem, ensuring the delivery of the en-
tire message.
How Stuff Works, "What Is a Packet?", http://www.howstuffworks.com/question525.htm
(last visited July 30, 2007). Surveillance for e-mail messages, then, must monitor the vari-
ous routes a message may take and electronically "sniff" all the packets as they move
through. Not surprisingly, this process is known as "packet sniffing":
Essentially, a packet sniffer is a program that can see all of the information
passing over the network it is connected to. As data streams back and forth
on the network, the program looks at, or "sniffs," each packet.
Normally, a computer only looks at packets addressed to it and ignores the
rest of the traffic on the network. When a packet sniffer is set up on a com-
puter, the sniffer's network interface is set to promiscuous mode. This means
that it is looking at everything that comes through. The amount of traffic
largely depends on the location of the computer in the network. A client
system out on an isolated branch of the network sees only a small segment of
the network traffic, while the main domain server sees almost all of it.
A packet sniffer can usually be set up in one of two ways:
Unfiltered - Captures all of the packets
Filtered - Captures only those packets containing specific data elements
Packets that contain targeted data are copied as they pass through. The pro-
gram stores the copies in memory or on a hard drive, depending on the pro-
gram's configuration. These copies can then be analyzed carefully for specific
information or patterns.
How Stuff Works "How Carnivore Worked", Packet Sniffing, http://computer.howstuff
works.com/carnivore2.htm (last visited July 30, 2007).
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attack on the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City. In short, some do-
mestic surveillance is inherent in effective counterterrorism efforts.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS (AND NOT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT)
This Essay focuses on the separation of powers concerns raised by do-
mestic surveillance, leaving aside the question whether such surveillance
violates the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions. 18 This fo-
cus, however, does not ignore values and principles central to the Fourth
Amendment. For one, separation of powers itself protects individual lib-
erty, as each branch of government is supposed to check abuses of power
by the other. Indeed, as the Court recently reiterated in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld,19 it is when government action threatens individual liberty that
strong checks are needed the most.20
Second, the Fourth Amendment incorporates notions of procedural
checks on abuse of power. For example, the Supreme Court has allowed
state police to conduct roadblocks to detect drunk drivers and protect
roadway safety.2 1 Such roadblocks burden the privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment by subjecting some travelers to unwanted scrutiny by
law enforcement. Further, the roadway stops pose the threat that law
enforcement will either discriminatorily target drivers based on a forbid-
den ground (for example, race, gender, etc.), or that the stops are a pre-
text for detecting other crimes (for example, drug or firearm possession).
The Court has permitted roadblocks only when procedural safeguards re-
duce the risk of police abuse. 22
C. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS
A company's compliance and ethics program consists of the personnel,
policies, and procedures that ensure employees and agents adhere to the
company's legal and ethical obligations. 23 For example, if a company has
agents that do business overseas, it must address the risk that those
agents might bribe foreign government officials to obtain business.24 The
company should draft policies addressing payments to foreign govern-
ment officials, train its agents on the relevant policies, monitor and audit
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 773-75 (reviewing the con-
stitutionality of the TSP under the Fourth Amendment).
19. 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004).
20. Id. at 536.
21. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421-22 (2004) (upholding drunk driving arrest
made at a checkpoint established to ask motorists about recent hit-an-run accident in the
area); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000); Mich. Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
22. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428 ("The police stopped all vehicles systematically. And there
is no allegation here that the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner
while questioning motorists during stops.") (citations omitted).
23. For a more detailed discussion of the origin, nature, and extent of corporate com-
pliance programs, see Paul McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 61 Bus. LAw. 1645
(2006).




its agents' expense statements, investigate suspicious activity, and disci-
pline those who violate the policy. As Part IV explains, a rich literature
discusses the best practices for designing and implementing each step of a
corporate compliance and ethics program.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS FIRST PRINCIPLES
Part II is not a summary or exposition of separation of powers doc-
trine.25 Rather, this Essay returns to the constitutional foundation, iden-
tifying first principles that underlie separation of powers analysis. The
discussion does so through a series of quotes that capture the main points.
The first three quotes are from James Madison's contributions to The
Federalist Papers;26 the next two quotes are from the Supreme Court's
2004 detainee decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld;27 and the last two quotes
are from Justice Robert Jackson's canonical concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.28 Each quote is followed by observations
about separating power among the three branches of the federal
government.
"IF MEN WERE ANGELS, NO GOVERNMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY." '2 9
This truism is the root of all other separation of powers principles.
Whether due to self-interest, prejudice, or some other human failing, so-
ciety requires an organizing force to ensure order.30 And this principle
applies to the rulers as well as the ruled, for a "government of the people,
by the people, and for the people" 31 will necessarily be "the greatest of all
reflections on human nature. ' 32 Consequently, "[i]n framing a govern-
ment which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."' 33 This is an application of
Lord Acton's Dictum: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts
absolutely. '34 The question is how best to get the government to "control
itself."
25. As the war on terror has been waged, this topic has been discussed at length. See,
e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of Powers, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 106 (2006); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543
(2002); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2673 (2005).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
27. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
30. 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT
OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: RULES AND ORDER
72 (1973) ("Law in the sense of enforced rules of conduct is undoubtedly coeval with soci-
ety; only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals
within society possible.").
31. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, the Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
33. Id.
34. Letter from John Dahlberg-Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 1887) (re-
printed in THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F.
2007] 1577
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"AMBITION MUST BE MADE TO COUNTERACT AMBITION." '3 5
This quote begins to answer how government might control the rul-
ers-a form of intra-governmental divide and conquer. Later in the same
passage, Madison elaborates on his point:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who ad-
minister each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provi-
sion for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commen-
surate to the danger of attack ..... This policy of supplying, by
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be
traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as
public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distri-
butions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the
other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel
over the public rights. 36
In short, government ought to be self-policing, and this plan had three
parts. First, while "dependence on the people" for re-election will be the
"primary control" against tyranny, an essential "auxiliary precaution" is
for each branch to check abuses of power by the other branches.37 Hence
the description of American government as one of checks and balances.
Second, an effective system of checks requires that each branch have ade-
quate "means"-that is, power-to check the other branches. For exam-
ple, the executive can check legislative overreaching through the veto 38
and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.39 The legislature can check
executive ambition by overriding a presidential veto,40 controlling federal
spending,41 or impeaching executive officials.42 Third, each branch must
be given the "motive"-that is, an incentive-to use their powers to
check the other branches.43
"THE ACCUMULATION OF ALL POWERS, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
AND JUDICIARY, IN THE SAME HANDS . . . MAY JUSTLY BE
PRONOUNCED THE VERY DEFINITION OF TYRANNY."
' 4 4
This quote is a corollary of the preceding one: If all power is consoli-
dated in the hands of a single branch, no other branch can check that
Kett, & James Trefil eds.) (3rd ed. 2002) (referring to the doctrine of papal infallibility in
the Catholic Church)).
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
39. Id. art. 11, § 3 (the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed").
40. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
41. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
42. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6-7.
43. Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1140-41
(2000).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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branch's ambition. Without checks, we are back to absolute power and
so tyranny. Yet, the danger of all government power ending up in the
hands of a single branch is relatively small. The real threat is unchecked
power over a specific subject, such as the treatment of those designated as
unlawful enemy combatants. 45 While limited in scope, such power would
be tyranny nonetheless. 46 So, this adage not only warns against collaps-
ing government into a single branch, but urges vigilance against pockets
of unchecked government power.
"[A] STATE OF WAR IS NOT A BLANK CHECK FOR THE PRESIDENT
WHEN IT COMES TO THE RIGHTS OF THE NATION'S CITIZENS."
'4 7
This principle anticipates a specific argument for consolidated federal
power: "But we are at war!" Of course, war may provide a rationale for
government action, or even justify deference to executive decisions.4 8
But war does not override the basic principle that each branch of govern-
ment has limited, checked power.
"[T]HE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION .. . MOST ASSUREDLY
ENVISIONS A ROLE FOR ALL THREE BRANCHES WHEN
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES ARE AT STAKE.
' 4 9
This principle is a further corollary of the warning against consolidating
government power. The President and Congress rarely claim sole power
over a particular subject, but instead argue for great deference from the
judicial branch. At times, this deference asks federal courts to simply
accept, without scrutiny, a judgment of that branch. For example, the
President has argued that federal courts should accept the executive's
sole judgment as to whether a person is an unlawful enemy combatant
subject to trial before a military commission.50
Generally speaking, arguments for judicial deference are appropriate,
as the judiciary must guard against accumulating too much power within
its own hands (that is, tyranny of the judiciary). The case for deference,
however, is weakest when individual liberties are at stake. Claims of indi-
vidual liberties often arise in cases where an unpopular individual op-
poses the will of the popular branches of government, making protection
in the political process unlikely. The federal judiciary, insulated from
popular pressure by life tenure, 51 is better situated to defend the rights of
these unpopular individuals. Thus, the federal courts should carefully
45. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780 (2006).
46. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (striking down the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of separation of powers).
47. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
48. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME (1998).
49. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
50. Id. at 535-36.
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour").
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scrutinize arguments for judicial deference when individual liberties are
at stake.
"[THE FRAMERS] SUSPECTED THAT EMERGENCY POWERS
WOULD TEND TO KINDLE EMERGENCIES."1
5 2
This principle is a specific application of the insight that government
actors tend to seek expansion of their power. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,53 decided during the Korean War, President Truman
argued that the Supreme Court ought to recognize implied emergency
powers in the executive branch. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
noted that any such power was likely to expand with the imagination of
whomever held the office.54 A President faced with no enumerated
power to justify an action would simply declare an emergency. 55 Justice
Jackson's core insight is that federal courts ought to precisely and care-
fully define executive power, as the future tendency will be toward the
most expansive application of that power.
56
"WHILE THE CONSTITUTION DIFFUSES POWER THE BETTER TO SECURE
LIBERTY, IT ALSO CONTEMPLATES THAT PRACTICE WILL INTEGRATE
THE DISPERSED POWERS INTO A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT.
' 5 7
This last principle is itself a check on the preceding principles: Checks
on government power ought not paralyze the government. The federal
courts must be sensitive to the practical consequences of their doctrines.
We want a government of checks and balances, with judicial review strik-
ing a realistic, workable balance. For, as President Abraham Lincoln
asked, "Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the
constitution? 5
8
III. THE THREAT TO LIBERTY FROM
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
Several commentators have noted that combating terrorism requires a
different focus from conventional law enforcement. 59 While law enforce-
ment takes a completed or ongoing action and asks who did it,
counterterrorism makes a predictive judgment to identify terrorists
before they strike. To quote the 9/11 Commission, "terrorism cannot be
52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
53. Id. at 587.
54. See id. at 634-38.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 635.
58. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President, United States, to Albert G. Hodges, Edi-
tor, Commonwealth (Frankfort, KY) (Apr. 4, 1864) (available at http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/alhtml/almss/ln001.html).
59. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr: THE CONSTITUTION IN
A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) [hereinafter POSNER, SUICIDE PACT].
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treated as a reactive law enforcement issue, in which we wait until after
the bad guys pull the trigger before we stop them."'60
Judge Richard Posner notes that this shift from law enforcement to
counterterrorism enlarges the amount of data required by the
government:
[P]revention requires intelligence agencies to cast a much wider and
finer-meshed net in fishing for information. Once a crime has oc-
curred, a focused search for the criminal and for evidence of the
crime is feasible. But if the concern guiding a search is that a crime
might occur, the focus has to be much broader. 6'
This change makes probable cause and reasonable suspicion-traditional
triggers for searches and seizures for domestic law enforcement-prob-
lematic. 62 For requiring individualized suspicion, the argument goes,
misses the very point of counterterrorism surveillance: We do not know
who they are or what they are planning.63
To illustrate the breadth of counterterrorism surveillance, consider the
example of data-mining:64
Data mining is the process of looking for new knowledge in existing
data. The basic problem addressed by data mining is turning low-
level data, usually too voluminous to understand, into higher forms
(information or knowledge) that might be more compact (for exam-
ple, a summary), more abstract (for example, a descriptive model),
or more useful (for example, a predictive model). At the core of the
data mining process is the application of data analysis and discovery
algorithms to enumerate and extract patterns from data in a
database. 65
60. Editorial, The Limits of Hindsight, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at A10; see also
POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 59, at 92-93 ("[W]hen the government is fighting ter-
rorism rather than ordinary crime, the emphasis shifts from punishment to prevention.").
61. POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 59, at 92-93.
62. See Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16
("[The Foreign Intelligance Surveillance Act] retains value as a framework for monitoring
the communications of known terrorists, but it is hopeless as a framework for detecting
terrorists. [FISA] requires that surveillance be conducted pursuant to warrants based on
probable cause to believe that the target of surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate
need is to find out who is a terrorist.").
63. K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the My-
thology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 123, 176-83
(2005).
64. For a skeptical view of whether data mining's proponents has proven that
method's efficacy, see Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 74 U.
CH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract id=990030. The Associated Press has reported that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion is planning a large-scale data mining project. Michael J. Sniffen, FBI Plans Huge Anti-
Terror Data-Mining, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 12, 2007.
65. K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCi. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 21 (2003); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF
USES 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4548.pdf ("The term 'data min-
ing' has a number of meanings. For purposes of this work, we define data mining as the
application of database technology and techniques-such as statistical analysis and model-
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Judge Posner describes the types of searches data mining might include:
Because of the volume involved, massive amounts of intercepted
data must first be sifted by computers. The sifting can take two
forms. One is a search for suspicious patterns or links; [for example,]
searching for "use of a stolen credit card for a small purchase at a gas
station-done to confirm whether a card is valid-before making a
very significant purchase," a pattern suggestive of credit card fraud.
The other form is the familiar Google-type search for more informa-
tion about a known individual, group, subject, activity, identifier, and
so on. A search for a social security number, for example, can reveal
whether two similar or identical names are the names of two persons
or one. The term "data mining" is sometimes limited to the first, the
pattern search. But it is often used to embrace the second as well.
66
While ordinary law enforcement begins with a known criminal act, and so
might search a database by querying fields (such as name, address, social
security number) for known information, counterterrorism tries to pre-
vent unknown events by unknown perpetrators, which makes the entire
database potentially relevant.6 7 The challenge in data mining is to ana-
lyze the underlying data using technologies that can reveal patterns and
relationships that would otherwise go undetected.
To perform data mining, the government must identify, collect, and ag-
gregate data, as do innumerable private firms that handle customer data:
Because terrorist groups and affiliations are now global, because the
number of potential terrorist targets is almost unlimited, because the
variety of weaponry to which these groups may gain access is enor-
mous, because modern surveillance technology can vacuum vast
amounts of data, and because some terrorist groups are good at bid-
ing their time-which means that data from years ago may shed light
on current and future terrorist schemes-the quantity of collectible
data that may contain clues to terrorist plans or activities is immense,
though not necessarily more immense than the data that commercial
ing-to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that
allow for the prediction of future results.") [hereinafter GAO DATA MINING REPORT].
66. POSNER, SUICIDE PAcr, supra note 59, at 96-97 (2006).
67. The Government Accounting Office describes one such data-mining effort:
One example of a large-scale development effort launched in the wake of the
September 11 attacks is the Multistate Anti-terrorism Information Exchange
System, known as MATRIX. MATRIX, currently used in five states, pro-
vides the capability to store, analyze, and exchange sensitive terrorism-re-
lated and other criminal intelligence data among agencies within a state,
among states, and between state and federal agencies. Information in MA-
TRIX databases includes criminal history records, driver's license data, vehi-
cle registration records, incarceration records, and digitized photographs.
Public awareness of MATRIX and of similar large-scale data mining or data
mining-like projects has led to concerns about the government's use of data
mining to conduct a mass "dataveillance"-a surveillance of large groups of
people-to sift through vast amounts of personally identifying data to find
individuals who might fit a terrorist profile.
GAO DATA MINING REPORT, supra note 65, at 5.
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services handle more or less effortlessly. 68
Similarly, private firms routinely analyze such data:
To be assembled, retrieved, sorted, and sifted, so that patterns can be
discerned and inferences drawn, intelligence data must be digitized,
and the digitized data organized in databases linked to thousands of
workstations (terminals, laptops, cellphones, in-vehicle displays, etc.)
scattered throughout the intelligence system, not to mention tens of
thousands of workstations elsewhere in the nation's farflung, poorly
integrated, federal, state, local, and private security network. But
that too is not unique.69
And like data collected by private firms, the government's data will be
vulnerable to abuse or attack.7 0 Data could be improperly disclosed, ei-
ther through inadvertence or misconduct of government personnel who
handle the data, or through the wrongful acts of those who obtain unau-
thorized access to the data.7 1 Disclosure can cause harm through either
embarrassment or the subsequent misuse of the information (for exam-
ple, identity theft or blackmail). 72 Also, the data could be abused by
those with authorized access,7 3 as when the government targets its politi-
cal opponents.74 And even legitimate use of the data can lead to false
positives, such as when an innocent person is mistakenly identified as a
terrorist target.75
The threats posed by domestic surveillance raise serious separation of
powers concerns. Recall that when liberty is at issue, 7 6 first principles
counsel that the federal courts should play some role in checking abuses
of government power. Here, the judiciary must play some role checking
68. RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN
THE THROES OF REFORM 141 (Peter Berkowitz & Tod Lindberg eds. 2006) [hereinafter
POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD].
69. Id. at 141-42.
70. POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 59, at 97-98 ("The principal worry about these
searches from the standpoint of privacy, besides fear that hackers will gain access to the
contents of the intercepted communications, is that those contents might be used to black-
mail or otherwise intimidate the administration's critics and political opponents. A secon-
dary fear is that they might be used to ridicule or embarrass. Such things have happened in
the past, but they are less likely to happen today."). For a thorough discussion of the
various aspects of privacy, as well as its specific application to surveillance, see Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
71. The Privacy Act provides, in part, that "[n]o agency shall disclose any record which
is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent
of, the individual to whom the record pertains .. " 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2005).
72. See Solove, supra note 70, at 536, 542.
73. See Taipale, supra note 63, at 176-83; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI
Legal Technician Pleads Guilty To Unlawfully Accessing The FBI's Computer System
(Feb. 26, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/opa/pr/2004/February/O4_crm_120.htm.
74. COMM'N ON CIA AcrIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT 172-207 (June 1975).
75. See Solove, supra note 70, at 516-19.
76. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD, supra note 68, at 87-88 ("Domestic intelligence
presents civil liberties concerns that are absent when intelligence agencies operate abroad,




the abuses posed by data collection, analysis, and storage. Part V argues
that judicial review ought to examine whether the government's domestic
surveillance programs implement an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram designed to reduce threats to data security. The next part describes
what such a program entails.
IV. COMPLIANCE AND DATA PRIVACY
This Part links compliance and ethics programs to constitutional law.
Section A describes the elements of an effective compliance and ethics
program. Section B then explains how the 1977 case, Whalen v. Roe77
incorporated the concept of compliance and ethics into its constitutional
analysis of database privacy. Section C then describes how modern fed-
eral law has developed concrete guidance for designing and implementing
an effective data privacy compliance and ethics program.
A. COMPLIANCE GENERALLY
All businesses take some measures to ensure that their employees and
agents comply with applicable laws. After all, the simple directive to "be
careful" is an informal attempt to comply with the negligence duty of
care. Compliance and ethics programs formalize and expand upon these
ad hoc efforts. The formality comes from designating personnel responsi-
ble for the compliance and ethics programs, and implementing organiza-
tional infrastructures that carry out the various compliance and ethics
functions. The expansion comes from a comprehensive attempt to iden-
tify and address the organization's legal risks and ethical principles.
Historically, businesses have had two main reasons to implement a
compliance and ethics program. First, such programs hold the promise of
reducing misconduct by both educating employees about their legal re-
sponsibilities and deterring potential wrongdoers. 78 Compliance and eth-
ics programs, then, are sensible when the expected reduction in liability
costs exceeds the cost of implementing the program.7 9 Second, after
prosecuting an organization for wrongdoing, the government has often
required implementation of a compliance and ethics program.80 This oc-
77. 429 U.S. 589 (1976).
78. Generally, corporate compliance and ethics programs are not a defense to corpo-
rate criminal or civil vicarious liability. See generally Andrew Weissmann with David New-
man, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411 (2007). There are, however,
specific regulatory areas where the government has incentivized the institution of such
programs. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
79. Costs would include not only the pecuniary payout for liability (for example, fines,
damages), but also the costs of dealing with the claim of legal violation (for example, attor-
neys fees, opportunity cost of responding to the claims), loss of good will, and other similar
costs associated liability.
80. See Weissmann with Newman, supra note 78, at 444-46 (discussing the Depart-
ment of Justice's use of deferred prosecution agreements). The government has also re-
cently included compliance requirements in corporate deferred prosecution agreements.
See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 904 (2007).
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curred after industry scandals involving price fixing, insider trading, and
health care fraud.
Over the last fifteen years, the incentives towards compliance have
themselves become more formal. The trend began in 1991 when the
United States Sentencing Commission promulgated organizational sen-
tencing guidelines that mandated leniency for organizations that had an
effective compliance and ethics program. 8' Since then, a variety of state
and federal agencies have encouraged compliance and ethics programs
through guidance or incentives. For example, the Office of the Inspector
General in the United States Department of Health and Human Services
has issued compliance program guidance for preventing health care
fraud, 82 and the United States Department of Justice has directed United
States Attorneys to consider either deferring or declining prosecution of
organizations that have an effective compliance and ethics program.83 In
addition, an effective program can defend against vicarious civil liability
for sexual harassment,84 commodities fraud, 85 or workplace safety viola-
tions.86 And a recent wave of laws and regulations require compliance
and ethics programs, making the program itself an aspect of complying
with the law.87 The clear legal trend is toward greater emphasis on pri-
vate compliance and ethics programs.
While compliance and ethics programs cover a variety of risks and in-
dustries, they contain a basic set of elements regardless of the organiza-
tion. The following ten steps are core requirements of an effective
program:88
1. Periodic risk assessments
81. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg.
22,762 (May 16, 1991) (amending U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f).
82. See McGreal, supra note 23, at n.43-52 (discussing the HHS compliance guidance
documents).
83. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and United States Attorneys 12-15 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.
corporatecompliance.com/events/07docs/AC-McNulty/FTL1-20075Lv/Paul %205.pdf.
84. See McGreal, supra note 23, at n.76-68.
85. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Carnegie Trading Group, Ltd., 450 F.
Supp. 2d 788, 804-05 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
86. See W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 459 F.3d 604, 608-09 (5th Cir. 2006).
87. For example, the USA Patriot Act requires financial institutions to implement and
operate anti-money laundering compliance programs, with the failure to do so subjecting
the firm to a fine. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(h) (West 2002). And three states now require orga-
nizations with more than fifty employees to provide biennial sexual harassment training for
supervisors. See CAL. GOVT CODE ANN. § 12950.1 (West Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-54(15)(B) (West Supp. 2006); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807(3) (Supp.
2006). Some state statutes merely "encourage" employers to provide such training. See,
e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(f) (2003) ("Employers... are encouraged to conduct an
education and training program.. . for all current employees ... and for all new employees
88. Depending on the author, the precise number of steps may vary, but the core com-
ponents will be the same. For example, the current United States Sentencing Guidelines
list eight steps, as they include the code of conduct and drafting of written compliance
standards into a single step. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)
(2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/8b2-l.html.
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2. Involvement of the organization's governing authority
3. Designating compliance personnel
4. Code of conduct
5. Written compliance and ethics standards and procedures
6. Employee and agent training
7. Lines of communication
8. Auditing and monitoring
9. Enforcement, discipline, and positive incentives
10. Periodic evaluation and improvement
Consider each step in turn.
1. Periodic risk assessments: The organization must identify and pri-
oritize its legal and other risks. Once completed, the risk assessment
serves as the blueprint for designing and operating the compliance and
ethics program. A risk assessment should be performed both when de-
signing a program and at sensible intervals thereafter.89
2. Involvement of the organization's governing authority: The or-
ganization's board (or other similar body) should initiate and exercise
oversight of the compliance and ethics program. This typically entails
authorizing resources and personnel to undertake the compliance ef-
fort, and establishing a timetable and measurable goals. Thereafter,
the board should exercise oversight through regular reports from com-
pliance personnel. Along with upper management, the board sets the
"tone at the top," showing that the organization takes its compliance
and ethics program seriously.
3. Designating compliance personnel: The organization must assign
someone overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program,
and assign someone else responsibility for day-to-day operation of the
program. Typically, overall responsibility resides in a chief compliance
officer. The main concern here is that the chief compliance officer
have the time, authority, and resources to carry out the compliance
functions. For example, an organization should consider carefully
whether to add the chief compliance officer title to the general counsel,
who may already wear several other hats within the organization. 90
4. Code of conduct: The code of conduct is the constitution of the
compliance and ethics program. As such, the code should set forth the
program's broad outlines, leaving the details for specific policies. The
code should summarize the organization's core values, identify its ma-
jor legal risks, identify the personnel responsible for the program's
components, and describe the processes for asking questions and re-
porting violations. Further, the code should be written so that it is rele-
vant and accessible to the organization's various constituencies. 91
89. See McGreal, supra note 9, at 192 (discussing the need for periodic risk
assessments).
90. See Paul E. McGreal, Best Practices in Corporate Compliance: Survey Results and
Analysis-Part I, 14 Fed. Ethics Rep. (CCH) (July 2007).
91. There may be good reason for an organization to have more than one code of
conduct. See Joe Murphy & Win Swenson, 20 Questions to Ask About Your Code of Con-
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5. Written compliance and ethics standards and procedures: The or-
ganization's written standards and procedures are the operating docu-
ments of the compliance and ethics program. For example, every
organization should have a sexual harassment policy that sets forth the
organization's commitment to a harassment-free workplace, identifies
what behavior the organization prohibits, lists the punishment for a vi-
olation of the policy, sets forth the procedures for asking questions and
reporting violations, and establishes the procedures for investigating
complaints and imposing discipline. The organization should adopt
similar standards and procedures for its other major risks areas. 92 The
standards and procedures should be periodically revised to take ac-
count of changes in the law and the organization's business
environment.
6. Employee and agent training: For the compliance and ethics pro-
gram to work, an organization must ensure that its employees and
agents93 understand and follow the policies and procedures. Simply
distributing documents will not suffice. While documents memorialize
the program and serve as references, they cannot substitute for train-
ing. The main training options are live presentations, videos, and com-
puter-based modules, with the main tradeoff between cost and
effectiveness. Testing comprehension is also important: An organiza-
tion devoting valuable time and money to training will want to know
whether the training is working.
7. Lines of communication: There are two main lines of communi-
cation in a compliance and ethics program: information and miscon-
duct. First, the organization should open lines of communication to
disseminate information about the compliance program. This includes
helplines for seeking guidance about the compliance and ethics stan-
dards and procedures, as well as reporting lines that generate periodic,
formal feedback about the operation of the compliance and ethics pro-
gram.94 Second, the organization should establish a system for receiv-
ing reports of possible misconduct. A reporting system must address
issues such as the degree of confidentiality promised, whether anony-
mous reporting is permitted, and how to avoid conflicts of interest.95
duct, ETHIKOS & CORP. CONDUct Q. (July-Aug. 2003), available at http://www.singerpubs.
com/ethikos/html/20questions.html.
92. The major risk areas should have been identified and prioritized during the risk
assessment. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. The question of when and to what extent to include independent contractors in the
compliance and ethics program is tricky. On the one hand, the organization does not want
to exercise sufficient control over independent contractors to convert them into employees.
On the other hand, the organization does not want to be seen as dealing with parties who
do not follow similar corporate values.
94. For example, each business unit may have a compliance and ethics officer who
makes quarterly reports to the chief compliance officer.
95. For example, a policy should not require that all reports of sexual harassment be
made to a department supervisor, as a supervisor could be a harasser.
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8. Auditing and monitoring: In addition to receiving reports, an ef-
fective compliance and ethics program should audit and monitor criti-
cal tasks for red flags. Such reviews can detect suspicious activity
before it matures into a legal violation, or stop legal violations before
they increase in scope or magnitude. For example, consider an organi-
zation concerned that its agents might bribe foreign government offi-
cials to obtain or retain business. The organization should have strict
policies about payments and reimbursements to such agents, and
should monitor and audit an agent's reimbursement requests for suspi-
cious items.
9. Enforcement, discipline, and positive incentives: When a sus-
pected violation is detected through reporting, monitoring, or auditing,
the next step is to investigate and decide whether fire lies behind the
smoke. The investigation must balance several interests: preventing re-
taliation against the person who discovered the potential violation, pro-
tecting the privacy of the accused, and avoiding obstruction of the
investigation and additional possible legal violations. Once the investi-
gation is completed, the organization must mete out appropriate disci-
pline. Throughout the disciplinary process, the organization should
document each step so it can prove that the investigation was thorough
and fair.
In addition to discipline, recent compliance guidance suggests offer-
ing positive incentives to those who contribute to the compliance and
ethics program.9 6 For example, the organization can add compliance
and ethics criteria to employee evaluations, or it could recognize em-
ployees who take steps to improve the operation or design of the com-
pliance and ethics program. In doing so, however, the organization
must avoid the perception that "compliance and ethics" is a pretext for
rewarding favored employees.
10. Periodic evaluation and improvement: The compliance and eth-
ics program must be a continuous feedback loop-compliance person-
nel must learn from their experiences. For example, training sessions
or calls to the helpline may raise questions or concerns that expose a
weakness in the program. Or monitoring, auditing, and reporting
might identify risks or red flags that were not caught in the risk assess-
ment. The compliance and ethics program must have a formal process
for self-evaluation and modification to generate and take account of
such feedback. In addition, to avoid conflicts of interest, some periodic
evaluations should be conducted by personnel independent of those in
charge of the compliance and ethics program. 9 7 For example, the or-
ganization could retain an outside expert to conduct the assessment, or
96. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(6) (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/8b2_l.html.
97. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 103.125(d)(4) (2006) (anti-money laundering compliance pro-
gram for a money services business should "[p]rovide for independent review to monitor
and maintain an adequate program").
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designate personnel with relevant expertise from another unit, such as
internal audit, to do so.98
In addition to the preceding ten steps, the government expects an or-
ganization to foster an institutional culture that supports the compliance
and ethics program. A speech by Stephen Cutler, then-Director of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Division of Enforcement, put it
this way: "[D]on't fall victim to a checklist mentality ..... '[G]ood gov-
ernance is not achieved by simply adhering to "checklists" of recom-
mended "best practices."' 9 9 Culture amounts to walking the compliance
and ethics talk:
All the words in the world mean nothing without deeds to support
them. You have to pay more than lip service to values. You have to
live them. The last few years have provided any number of examples
of companies that failed to practice what they appeared to preach.
Enron had the corporate slogan of "Respect, Integrity, Community,
Excellence." To the employees and shareholders who lost their pen-
sions or their life savings in the fraud, the words of that slogan ring
rather hollow. In October 2003, at a conference of corporate direc-
tors, then Chairman and CEO of Computer Associates Sanjay
Kumar bragged about his company's state-of-the-art corporate gov-
ernance and business ethics practices. At the same time, according
to the cases filed against him, Mr. Kumar was engaged in a large-
scale fraud. As former IBM CEO Lou Gerstner has said, "you can't
simply give a couple of speeches or write a new credo for the com-
pany and declare that a new culture has taken hold. You can't man-
date it, can't engineer it. What you can do is create the conditions
for transformation. You can provide incentives. '" 10 0
Even if all ten of the above compliance and ethics tasks are performed to
the state-of-the-art, the program is doomed if employees and agents
doubt the organization's sincerity. And sincerity goes back to the old
childhood adage that actions speak louder than words. Cutler concluded
his speech with a series of practical examples: "managers themselves have
to comply with the letter and the spirit of the rules"; 10 ' "make integrity,
98. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY: FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
FIN-2006-G012, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT REVIEWS
OF MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAMS 2 (2006), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/GuidanceMSB-Independent-Audits9-21.pdf ("Our regulations
require an independent review, not a formal audit by a certified public accountant or third-
party consultant. Accordingly, a money services business does not necessarily need to hire
an outside auditor or consultant. The review may be conducted by an officer, employee or
group of employees, so long as the reviewer is not the designated compliance officer and
does not report directly to the compliance officer.").
99. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Second
Annual General Counsel Roundtable: Tone at the Top: Getting it Right (Dec. 3, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl203O4smc.htm (quoting RICHARD C.
BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ON CORPORATE GOVERN-






ethics and compliance part of the promotion, compensation and evalua-
tion processes"; 02 and "make it clear that you won't tolerate compliance
risks-even if that means losing a lucrative piece of business or a client or
a transaction.' ' 10 3 To return to a metaphor from the beginning of this
section, if the risk assessment is the compliance and ethics program's blue
print, then the organization's culture is the foundation.
B. COMPLIANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: WHALEN V. ROE
The Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe10 4 illustrates how an
ethics and compliance program (though the Court never called it that)
can influence constitutional analysis. There, a New York law targeted the
problem posed by diversion of drugs with legal uses "into unlawful chan-
nels."' 0 5 For example, patients and physicians might use multiple or fake
prescriptions to circumvent the state's drug control laws. To combat such
abuse, one provision of the law prescribed record-keeping requirements
for certain drugs:
[A]I1 prescriptions for [the specified] drugs [must] be prepared by the
physician in triplicate on an official form. The completed form iden-
tifies the prescribing physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug
and dosage; and the name, address, and age of the patient. One copy
of the form is retained by the physician, the second by the pharma-
cist, and the third is forwarded to the New York State Department of
Health in Albany. A prescription made on an official form may not
exceed a 30-day supply, and may not be refilled.10 6
The database was supposed to reduce drug misuse in two ways. First, the
state could analyze the data for patterns that indicated illegal use. 10 7 Sec-
ond, enhanced detection would deter misuse. 10 8
Similar to the data mining described above, the New York database
accumulated immense amounts of data concerning legitimate activity
(here, legal drug prescriptions) to detect the few cases of illegal activity
(here, drug abuse). For example, during the first twenty months that the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
105. Id. at 591.
106. Id. at 593.
107. The special commission that proposed the database described this process as
follows:
Once the department has received the copies, it will be able to compile data
which will uncover irregularities such as forgeries, fraudulent obtaining of
schedule[d] substances, and thefts of prescription blanks and their misuse by
unauthorized persons. The information received by the department will
show if a patient has obtained prescriptions by going from doctor to doctor,
or if stolen prescriptions are being used. This procedure will also indicate
where there has been an over-prescribing or over-dispensing of [specified]
drugs.
Brief of Appellant at 6, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
1814-00. Of course, this method is not perfect, as it would not detect a person who obtains
multiple prescriptions under different names.
108. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
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database operated, the state collected an average of 100,000 prescription
forms per month, and the data contributed to only two drug misuse inves-
tigations.t 09 This led the appellees to characterize the database as "a vast
state system which uses a dragnet more likely to expose the names of
patients seeking drugs for legitimate medically indicated use than those
obtaining drugs for illicit purposes." 110
The plaintiffs, who were prescribed drugs covered by the record-keep-
ing provision, argued that the database threatened harm due to misuse or
disclosure of their data. Misuse could consist of the state stereotyping an
individual in the database as a drug addict and discriminating against the
person on that basis. Disclosure could occur either through a state em-
ployee leaking the information or an outsider gaining unauthorized ac-
cess.'1 These fears, in turn, allegedly discouraged patients from seeking
needed medications. 112 Note that these arguments parallel those regard-
ing modern domestic surveillance: Centralized collection of data expo-
nentially increases the harm posed by abuse of the data. 1 3
The Supreme Court upheld the database, largely due to state-man-
dated controls that minimized the threat of abuse:
114
109. Id. at 593-95. In its amicus brief, the State of California stated that it had used its
comparable database in over three hundred investigations in the preceding two years. See
Brief for State of California as Amicus Curaie Supporting Appellants at note 2, Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1975 WL 173716.
110. Brief of Appellees at 17, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976
WL 181402. The appellees also challenged the efficacy of the database. For example,
while a search of the records would identify a person who obtained multiple prescriptions
under the same name, it could not detect a person who used an alias to obtain the prescrip-
tions. Id.
111. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-01 ("Health Department employees may violate [state
law] by failing, either deliberately or negligently, to maintain proper security.").
112. Brief of Appellees at 9, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
18401.
113. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; POSNER, SUICIDE PACr, supra note
59, at 135 ("[U]ntil recently the information that people voluntarily disclosed to vendors,
licensing bureaus, hospitals, and so on was scattered, fugitive (because the bulkiness of
paper records usually causes them to be discarded as soon as they lose their value to the
enterprise), and searchable only with great difficulty-which provided further incentive to
discard information. So although one had voluntarily disclosed private information on in-
numerable occasions to sundry recipients, one retained as a practical matter a great deal of
privacy.").
114. The appellees attacked the state's efforts to prevent misuse or disclosure of the
data:
[T]he plaintiffs presented uncontradicted testimony of a computer expert
that personnel checks were inadequate, the turnover in temporary help was
dangerous, the physical security of the building nonexistent, and the data
security system unsophisticated.
The state's only response to the plaintiffs' evidence about the system's lack of
security was to introduce the deposition testimony of... the director of the
Bureau of Controlled Substances Licensing. [The director] admitted that
there were no written procedures for processing printouts from the system,
that he was unaware of the nature of employment background checks, if any,
which were conducted on personnel employed by the data center, that he did
not know whether or not any personnel had criminal records, that of the 17
employees in the State Bureau "We may have five or six, possibly seven new
ones," within the past year, and that he did not know the background of
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[P]rescription forms are delivered to a receiving room at the Depart-
ment of Health in Albany each month. They are sorted, coded, and
logged and then taken to another room where the data on the forms
is recorded on magnetic tapes for processing by a computer. There-
after, the forms are returned to the receiving room to be retained in
a vault for a five-year period and then destroyed as required by the
statute. The receiving room is surrounded by a locked wire fence
and protected by an alarm system. The computer tapes containing
the prescription data are kept in a locked cabinet. When the tapes
are used, the computer is run "off-line," which means that no termi-
nal outside of the computer room can read or record any informa-
tion. Public disclosure of the identity of patients is expressly
prohibited by the statute and by a Department of Health regulation.
Willful violation of these prohibitions is a crime punishable by up to
one year in prison and a $2,000 fine.11 5
Here, one can glimpse aspects of an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram. For example, the state had a policy prohibiting the disclosure of
patient information as well as specified punishment for a violation. Fur-
ther, the Court saw evidence that the controls actually worked, as there
was no evidence of problems with the New York database or similar
databases in two other states. 116 One would want to know, however,
temporary employees, the employment testing or processing for selecting
them, or whether they had criminal records or not.
Brief of Appellees at 11-12, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
181402. Note that these assertions raise several concerns about whether the state managed
the database under an effective compliance and ethics program. For example, the state
allegedly took insufficient steps to ensure that those who handled the data were trustwor-
thy. This goes against the Sentencing Guidelines requirement that an effective compliance
and ethics program use "due diligence" in performing background checks on employees
who will exercise "substantial authority" within the organization. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(3) (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/
862_/.html ("the organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the substan-
tial authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or
should have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal activities
or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics program"). Further,
the state allegedly had no written procedures regarding the handling of the data, and so
presumably never trained its personnel on how to handle the data. As discussed below, the
federal government now imposes such requirements on private firms that handle private
customer data. See infra Part IV.C. The lower court, however, made no findings on the
adequacy of the state's data security controls because it concluded that the database as a
whole lacked a sufficient law enforcement basis. See Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931,
933, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), overruled sub nom., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-
839), 1976 WL 181402; Brief of Appellees at 11, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) ("The
Court did not reach the question of the security of the state's computer system").
115. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593-95.
116. Id. at 590 ("There is no support in the record or in the experience of the two States
that New York program emulates, for assuming that the statute's security provisions will be
improperly administered."). Interestingly, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has
found that federal officials had submitted 75 warrant affidavits that contained "misstate-
ments and omissions of material facts," and that executive branch officials had improperly
shared foreign intelligence information with domestic law enforcement officials. In re All
Matters Submitted to For. Intel. Surv. Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (For. Intel. Surv.
Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (For. Intel. Surv. Rev. 2002).
Judge Richard Posner has proposed a strict separation of foreign intelligence and domestic
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whether the state had other compliance functions, such as whether there
was auditing or monitoring for violations of this non-disclosure rule.
The Court concluded its opinion by leaving open the question of what
role the existence of data security measures should play in future analysis:
A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware
of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts
of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the di-
rection of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal
laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of infor-
mation, much of which is personal in character and potentially em-
barrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Rec-
ognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots
in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and
its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper con-
cern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. We
therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data
whether intentional or unintentional or by a system that did not con-
tain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this record
does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 1 7
This passage yields two points relevant to the current analysis. First, in
reviewing the constitutionality of government collection, analysis, and
storage of citizen data, a court should consider what safeguards the gov-
ernment has implemented to prevent improper use or disclosure of the
data. These safeguards are in essence compliance and ethics measures
tailored to data security. Second, since Whalen was decided in 1977, the
understanding and requirements of an effective compliance and ethics
program in general, and for data security specifically, have changed dra-
matically. Indeed, as the next section explains, recent federal regulations
prescribe rather detailed compliance measures for firms that handle cus-
tomer data. In Part V, this Essay suggests that Whalen's insight about the
constitutional relevance of compliance measures be updated to take ac-
count of the increased formality and sophistication of modern compliance
and ethics programs.
law enforcement, with significant criminal penalties to deter violations. POSNER, SUICIDE
PACT, supra note 59, at 151-52.
117. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (emphasis added); see also id. at 607 ("In this case, as
the Court's opinion makes clear, the State's carefully designed program includes numerous
safeguards intended to forestall the danger of indiscriminate disclosure. Given this serious
and, so far as the record shows, successful effort to prevent abuse and limit access to the
personal information at issue, I cannot say that the statute's provisions for computer stor-
age, on their face, amount to a deprivation of constitutionally protected privacy interests,
any more than the more traditional reporting provisions.") (Brennan, J., concurring).
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C. MODERN COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR DATA PRIVACY
This Part discusses two areas where federal law requires private firms
to design and implement compliance and ethics measures to protect cus-
tomer data: First, the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement actions
regarding customer data collected through a company's web site; second,
federal banking regulations that require protection of customer data. As
the following discussion illustrates, the federal government requires
heightened diligence of private firms that handle customer data.
The Federal Trade Commission Act charges the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC") with enforcing the Act's prohibition of "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."'] 18 The FTC has recently
applied this provision to privacy promises made by commercial web-
sites. 119 The typical privacy policy makes specific assurances about the
protection and use of customer information, such as name, address,
phone number, and credit card information. The FTC has argued that
these assurances impliedly assert that the vendor takes adequate mea-
sures to protect customer data. If the vendor does not in fact have such
measures in place, the implied assertion (and thus the privacy policy) is
false-a deceptive act in violation of the FTC Act.
To illustrate this type of violation, consider the FTC's enforcement ac-
tion against Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. 120 The FTC alleged that pur-
chasers on Petco's website had to submit "personal information,
including, but not limited to, name, address, and credit card number and
expiration date."1 21 The information was then stored "in a database that
supports or connects to [Petco's] website." 122 Petco's website made the
following assurance about the handling of customer information: "The
server encrypts all of your information; no one except you can access
it. '123 Yet, the FTC alleged, Petco did not store customer data in en-
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1)-(2) (2005).
119. In 1999, the FTC issued its first complaint based on this theory against the web-
hosting service GeoCities. Complaint, In re GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94 (F.T.C. 1999) (No. C-
3850), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/02/9823015cmp.htm.
120. Complaint, In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 032-3221, 2004 WL 2682593
(F.T.C. Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323221/041108comp0323
221.pdf [hereinafter Petco Complaint]. For a collection of FTC enforcement actions re-
garding website privacy promises, see Federal Trade Commission: Privacy Initiatives: Un-
fair & Deceptive Practices: Enforcement, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/
promises.enf.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2007).
121. Petco Complaint, supra note 120, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2; see also Complaint at 2, In re Microsoft Corp., No. C-4069, 2002 WL
31881313 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0123240/micro
softcmp.pdf ("[Microsoft] did not maintain a high level of online security by employing
sufficient measures reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances to maintain and
protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal information obtained from or about
consumers in connection with the Passport and Passport Wallet services. In particular, re-
spondent failed to implement and document procedures that were reasonable and appro-
priate to: (1) prevent possible unauthorized access to the Passport system; (2) detect
possible unauthorized access to the Passport system; (3) monitor the Passport system for
potential vulnerabilities; and (4) record and retain system information sufficient to perform
security audits and investigations.").
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crypted form, and the stored data was "vulnerable to commonly known
or reasonably foreseeable attacks from third parties." 124 Indeed, the FTC
issued its complaint after a Petco website user allegedly gained unautho-
rized access to customer information.12 5
In settling the case, the FTC's Decision and Order directed Petco to
design and implement an effective compliance and ethics program cover-
ing protection of customer information. 126 The relevant provision of the
Decision and Order is worth quoting in full, as it indicates what data pro-
tection measures the government itself believes are effective. The quoted
text is annotated by footnotes that identify the ten compliance and ethics
measures discussed above:127
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent, directly or through
any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection
with the online advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale,
or sale of any product or service, in or affecting commerce, shall, no
later than the date of service of this order, establish and implement,
and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive information security pro-
gram that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidential-
ity, and integrity of personal information collected from or about
consumers. 28 Such program, the content and implementation of
which must be fully documented in writing, 129 shall contain adminis-
trative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to respon-
dent's size and complexity, the nature and scope of respondent's
124. Petco Complaint, supra note 120, at 3. ("In truth and in fact, the personal informa-
tion respondent obtained from consumers through www.PETCO.com was not maintained
in an encrypted format and was accessible to persons other than the consumer providing
the information."). See also Complaint at 2, In re Guidance Software, Inc., No. C-4187,
2007 WL 183340 (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623057/
0623057%20-Guidance%20complaint.pdf (alleging the following lapses: "[R]espondent:
(1) stored the information in clear readable text; (2) did not adequately assess the vulnera-
bility of its web application and network to certain commonly known or reasonably fore-
seeable attacks, such as "Structured Query Language" (or "SQL") injection attacks; (3)
did not implement simple, low-cost, and readily available defenses to such attacks; (4)
stored in clear readable text network user credentials that facilitate access to sensitive per-
sonal information on the network; (5) did not use readily available security measures to
monitor and control connections from the network to the internet; and (6) failed to employ
sufficient measures to detect unauthorized access to sensitive personal information.")
125. Petco Complaint, supra note 120, at 3-4.
126. Decision and Order, In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. C-4133, 2005 WL
681260 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323221/050308do
023221.pdf.
127. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
128. This opening sentence implicates involvement of the organization's governing au-
thority. See supra text at pg. 1586. Presumably, the board has been periodically briefed on
the FTC's enforcement and approved the ultimate resolution. Board oversight of the com-
pany's compliance with the Decision and Order would fall within the board's overall re-
sponsibility to oversee the company's reporting and compliance systems. See supra note 88
and discussion on pp. 1585-89. See also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The board's oversight should include periodic reporting on the
required compliance and ethics program as well as ensuring that adequate resources are
committed to design and implementation of the program.
129. This provision implicitly requires the written documents entailed by a compliance
and ethics program, such as a code of conduct provision and company policies regarding
data security. See supra note 91-92 and accompanying text.
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activities, and the sensitivity of the personal information collected
from or about consumers, 130 including:
A. the designation of an employee or employees to coordinate and
be accountable for the information security program.1 3'
B. the identification of material internal and external risks to the
security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information that
could result in the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, loss, alteration,
destruction, or other compromise of such information, and assess-
ment of the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control these
risks.132 At a minimum, this risk assessment should include consider-
ation of risks in each area of relevant operation, including, but not
limited to: (1) employee training and management; 13 3 (2) informa-
tion systems, including network and software design, information
processing,. storage, transmission, and disposal; and (3) prevention,
detection, and response 134 to attacks, intrusions, or other systems
failures.
C. the design and implementation of reasonable safeguards to con-
trol the risks identified through risk assessment, 135 and regular test-
ing or monitoring of the effectiveness of the safeguards' key controls,
systems, and procedures.' 36
D. the evaluation and adjustment of respondent's information se-
curity program in light of the results of the testing and monitoring
required by subparagraph C,13 7 any material changes to respondent's
operations or business arrangements, or any other circumstances that
respondent knows or has reason to know may have a material impact
on the effectiveness of its information security program.' 38
In short, the FTC's Decision and Order requires all the elements of an
effective compliance and ethics program.
130. This sentence implicitly requires a risk assessment. See supra note 89 and accom-
panying text. The program cannot be "appropriate to respondent's size and complexity,
the nature and scope of respondent's activities," unless the company assesses the risks
posed by these aspects of its business.
131. This provision explicitly requires designation of compliance personnel. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
132. Here, the FTC specifically requires a risk assessment. See supra note 89 and ac-
companying text.
133. This is an explicit requirement of employee training. See supra note 93 and accom-
panying text.
134. Response to security breaches would presumably include investigation and (when
appropriate) discipline for violations of any internal policies or procedures. See supra note
96 and accompanying text,
135. Here again the Decision and Order requires written policies and procedures. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136. This is an explicit requirement of monitoring and auditing. See supra discussion on
pg. 1588.
137. This is an explicit requirement that the company periodically evaluate and improve
its compliance and ethics program. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
138. Decision and Order at 2-3, In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. C-4133, 2005
WL 681260 (F.T.C. MAR. 4, 2005) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323221/050
308do0323221.pdf. This provision is typical of other Consent Orders entered by the FTC.
See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order at 3-4, In re Guidance Software, Inc., No.
062-3057, 2006 WL 3478138 (F.T.C. Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/case
list/0623057/0623057 % 20-Guidance %20consent %20agreement.pdf.
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By rule, FTC banking regulations similarly require financial institutions
to implement compliance and ethics safeguards for customer informa-
tion.139 The rules are promulgated under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act,1 40 which recognizes that "each financial institution has an affirma-
tive and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and
to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic
personal information. '141 The Act requires financial institutions to make
certain disclosures regarding the privacy and use of customer informa-
tion, and directs federal agencies to promulgate compliance standards for
"financial institutions ... subject to their jurisdiction." 142 In response to
this directive, the FTC promulgated the Standards for Safeguarding Cus-
tomer Information Rule ("Safeguards Rule"), 143 which has the purpose
of "set[ting] forth standards for developing, implementing, and maintain-
ing reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to pro-
tect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
information.1' 4 4 The Safeguards Rule requires specified financial institu-
tions to "develop, implement, and maintain [an] information security pro-
gram," and defines the elements of such a program in a similar manner to
the website privacy cases just discussed. And, as with website privacy, the
FTC has brought enforcement actions for failure to abide by the Safe-
guards Rule.145
139. The FTC also has a set of guiding principles for businesses that handle customer
personal information:
1. Take stock. Know what personal information you have in your files and
on your computers.
2. Scale down. Keep only what you need for your business.
3. Lock it. Protect the information that you keep.
4. Pitch it. Properly dispose of what you no longer need.
5. Plan ahead. Create a plan to respond to security incidents.
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR Busi-
NESS 3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/privacy/bus69.pdf (last visited
Oct. 23, 2007).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2002).
141. Id. § 6801(a); see also id. § 6804(a)(1) (granting authority to "[t]he Federal banking
agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission to draft regula-
tions to enforce the Act").
142. Id. § 6805(a)(7) (provision regarding the FTC).
143. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1-314.5 (2007). The FTC has also promulgated the Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 313.1-313.3 (2007), which implements
the Act's disclosure requirements. All agencies covered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
have recently joined in proposing a model privacy form to be used by covered institutions.
See Interagency Proposal for Model Privacy Form Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 14,940 (Mar. 29, 2007).
144. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a) (2007). See Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information
Security Standards, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (2007).
145. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, In re Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., No. C-4129, 2005 WL
120875 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2005) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423153/050107
comp0423153.pdf. There, the FTC alleged:
[RIespondent failed to assess the risks to its customer information; imple-
ment reasonable policies and procedures in key areas, such as employee
training and appropriate oversight of the security practices of loan officers
working from remote locations; or oversee the collection and handling of
information through the Sunbelt Web site. Respondent also failed to take
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Separate from the FTC's Safeguards Rule, the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council, representing five federal agencies,146 has
promulgated a joint rule prescribing information security program stan-
dards for the financial institutions within their jurisdiction. 147 As do the
FTC standards, the Council's standards incorporate the ten compliance
and ethics program measures discussed above, including:
* A bank's board of directors shall "[a]pprove" and "[o]versee the
development, implementation, and maintenance of the bank's informa-
tion security program, including assigning specific responsibility for its
implementation and reviewing reports from management."' 148
* A bank shall "report to its board or an appropriate committee of
the board at least annually" regarding the operation of the information
security program. 149
* A bank shall both assess the risk and likelihood of "unauthorized
disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of customer information or
customer information systems" and "the sufficiency of policies, proce-
dures, customer information systems, and other arrangements in place to
control risks."'150
• A bank shall implement controls designed to protect customer in-
formation from unauthorized access.151
* A bank shall "[t]rain staff to implement the bank's information se-
curity program. '152
* A bank shall "[r]egularly test the key controls, systems and proce-
dures of the information security program ..... .Tests should be con-
ducted or reviewed by independent third parties or staff independent of
those that develop or maintain the security programs. '"153
* A bank shall monitor and audit for security breaches, and imple-
ment procedures for responding to breaches. 154
steps to ensure that its service providers were providing appropriate security
for Sunbelt's customer information.
Id. at 2. The Decision and Order in the case required Sunbelt to implement the required
information security program and to report the results of periodic program evaluations to
the FTC. Decision and Order at 3, In re Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., No. C-4129, 2005
WL 120875 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2005) available at http:/Iwww.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423153/050107
do0423153.pdf.
146. The five agencies are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. See Fed-
eral Financial Institutions Examination Council Home Page, http://www.ffiec.gov/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 4, 2007). In addition, the Council includes the State Liaison Committee. Id.
147. Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 12 C.F.R. pt.
208, app. D-2 (2007).
148. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2 9 III.A.
149. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2 III.F.
150. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2 9 III.B.
151. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2 III.C.1.
152. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-1 9 C.2.
153. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2 9 III.C.3.
154. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-1 9 III.C.1.f. & g.
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* A bank shall conduct "[b]ackground checks for employees who are
authorized to access to customer information .... 155
The standards discussed in this Part show how the federal government
requires private firms to design and implement compliance and ethics
programs that protect the privacy of customer personal information.
156
In designing and operating these programs, private business has evolved
substantial consensus regarding the minimum criteria for an effective
compliance and ethics program. As discussed in the next Part, these cri-
teria provide federal judges with standards to guide separation of powers
analysis.
V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A SEPARATION
OF POWERS PROPOSAL
The preceding parts of this Essay discuss aspects of the separation of
powers, constitutional protections for private information, and compli-
ance and ethic programs. The following discussion assimilates the pre-
ceding observations into four propositions, and then offers a proposed
tweak to our separation of powers analysis.
First, separation of powers requires some form of checks and balances
among the three branches of the federal government. The checks and
balances must be robust enough to prevent the accumulation of federal
power in a single branch of government, even if that accumulation is in a
narrow area. The need for checks and balances derives from human na-
ture-those entrusted with government power will seek to expand their
power.
Second, when the subject is individual liberty, it is important that the
federal judiciary play a meaningful role in checking the power of the
other two branches. This is because the popularly accountable
branches-the President and Congress-may not be adequately moti-
vated to protect individual liberties, as when the claimed liberty is
unpopular.
Third, modern domestic surveillance, even in aid of foreign intelli-
gence, entails the collection and storage of massive amounts of private
data concerning United States citizens. Citizens rightly fear that such
data could be either misused or improperly disclosed, raising issues of
individual liberty that (at times) may be unpopular. Separation of powers
suggests that the federal judiciary ought to be involved in checking Con-
gress and the President in this area. And Whalen v. Roe157 further sug-
gests that one such check ought to be judicial review to determine
155. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2, supp. A T II.
156. See also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996); CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY
AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 5 (2006); Vincent Serpico, Denise
Landers & Damon A. Terrill, Making Sense of U.S. State Data Privacy Law, 119 BANKING
L.J. 462, 462 (2002).
157. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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whether the President and Congress have implemented adequate safe-
guards to prevent misuse or improper disclosure of private information.
Fourth, what is today called a corporate compliance and ethics program
can provide needed safeguards against misuse or improper disclosure of
private data. Since the Court decided Whalen v. Roe158 in 1977, the fed-
eral government, the states, and private industry have developed both
general criteria for effective compliance and ethics programs, and specific
criteria for data security programs. These criteria are specific enough for
regulators,159 courts, 160 and prosecutors 6 1 to apply in determining
whether a regulated entity has taken adequate compliance measures.
Thus, the separation of powers doctrine should incorporate the modern
compliance and ethics program standards discussed in Part IV. Specifi-
cally, courts should ask whether the President and Congress have estab-
lished controls to prevent misuse or improper disclosure of private
information of United States citizens collected and stored during domes-
tic foreign intelligence surveillance.
A common objection to greater judicial review of federal antiterrorism
measures and defense of greater judicial deference to the President and
Congress is the courts' comparative lack of expertise in the area. 162 As
Judge Posner has put it, "[j]udges aren't supposed to know much about
national security."'1 63 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have also stated
that the "novelty of the threats and of the necessary responses makes
judicial routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even
obstructive. ' '164
One need not dispute these claims to endorse this Essay's proposal. 165
First, as discussed above, strong consensus exists among regulators and
private firms about the essential components of an effective compliance
and ethics program. Of course, there is discussion and debate regarding
some details, such as whether the corporate compliance officer ought to
report through the organization's legal department or directly to the
CEO or a board committee. But courts can apply the consensus stan-
dards and give deference where consensus runs out.
Second, we know that evaluating compliance and ethics programs is
not beyond judicial competence because courts already do so in several
contexts. As discussed above, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
160. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2006), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/2006guid/8b2_l.html.
161. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys 12-15 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.cor-
poratecompliance.com/events/07docs/ACMcNulty/FFL1-20075/v/Paul%201 .pdf.
162. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 31 (2007) ("Judges are generalists, and the political insulation
that protects them from current politics also deprives them of information, especially infor-
mation about novel security threats and necessary responses to those threats.").
163. POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 59, at 37 (emphasis in original).
164. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 162, at 18.
165. For a criticism of these calls for judicial deference, see Solove, supra note 64, at 2.
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direct federal courts to assess the effectiveness of a corporate defendant's
compliance and ethics program as a mitigating factor in criminal sentenc-
ing.166 In federal sexual harassment and civil rights cases, federal courts
assess a corporate defendant's compliance and ethics program in litigat-
ing a defense to vicarious liability.1 67 Under state corporate law, recent
decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court suggest that that state's
courts will now assess whether a corporate board has adhered to compli-
ance best practices in ruling on a motion to dismiss claims against direc-
tors. 168  And courts and agencies are increasingly incorporating
compliance and ethics efforts into legal tests. 169 It is far too late in the
day to claim that evaluating compliance and ethics programs is beyond
judicial competence.
The remaining question is whether corporate compliance and ethics
measures ought to be a safe harbor or a constitutional requirement.
Here, Justice Jackson's admonition looms large: "While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that prac-
tice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." 170
This counsels a safe harbor approach for three reasons. First, while cor-
porate compliance and ethics programs have proven effective at checking
private misconduct, they may not be the only (or even best) measure for
checking abuse of government power. Consequently, this Essay's modest
proposal ought to proceed modestly, recognizing the inherent limits of
human knowledge. 171
Second, even a safe harbor provides the powerful incentive of a specific
outcome-here, constitutionality-whereas alternative measures offer
uncertainty. Further, this safe harbor holds the benefit of identifiable cri-
teria that provide concrete guidance for government action. In designing
and implementing a compliance and ethics program to protect citizen
166. See supra notes 90, 87, 95, 111 and accompanying text.
167. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (good faith compli-
ance efforts can be a defense to punitive damages liability in federal civil rights action);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (reasonable efforts to detect and remedy incidents of sexual har-
assment can be defense to employer liability) (same).
168. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372-73 (Del. 2006); Desimone v. Barrows, 924
A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969
(Del. Ch. 1996); see also Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 62 Bus. LAW.
(forthcoming 2007) (discussing the relevance of best practices to claim that directors vio-
lated their duty to not consciously disregard oversight of the corporation's compliance and
ethics program).
169. See W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 459 F.3d 604, 608-09 (5th Cir. 2006); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Carnegie Trading Group, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 2d 788, 803-04 (N.D. Ohio 2006); U.S. v.
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 440-41 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (in a
lawsuit under the Federal False Claims Act, the lack of an effective corporate compliance
and ethics program is probative evidence of whether the corporate defendant recklessly
disregarded the risk that it was submitting false claims to the government).
170. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
171. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SO-
CIALISM (W.W. Bartley IlI ed., 1988).
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data, the federal government can benchmark against private entities that
must perform the same tasks for private customer data.172 Indeed, in
some instances the federal government will be analyzing data obtained
from private databases that are themselves legally required to have data
security compliance and ethics programs. 173
Third, judges will be more timid in identifying and applying compliance
and ethics principles if doing so poses a constitutional bar to government
action. As Judge Posner has written:
Judges, knowing little about the needs of national security, are un-
likely to oppose their own judgment to that of the executive branch,
which is responsible for the defense of the nation. They are espe-
cially unlikely to interpose constitutional objections because of the
difficulty of amending the Constitution to correct judicial error.'74
The safe harbor frees judges to rule definitively on compliance and ethics
principles, knowing that the federal government may experiment with al-
ternate arrangements.
To summarize, this Essay proposes the following separation of powers
analysis. When the federal government collects private information of
United States citizens while conducting foreign intelligence surveillance,
separation of powers demands that adequate checks and balances protect
against abuse or misuse of the information. The government may carry
this burden by demonstrating that its data collection, analysis, and stor-
age operate under an effective compliance and ethics program. If the
government does not carry this burden, it must then show that its surveil-
lance includes internal controls with the same level of protection pro-
vided by an effective compliance and ethics program.
Though not discussed here, this separation of powers analysis logically
extends to all government programs that handle private citizen data. For
example, a report by the United States General Accounting Office
("GAO") notes that "52 [federal government] agencies are using or are
planning to use data mining." 175 The Privacy Act 176 and the Federal In-
formation Security Management Act of 2002177 require that agencies take
measures to protect their data from improper disclosure, and the Office
of Management and Budget 178 and the National Institute of Standards
172. See supra Part IV.A. and accompanying text.
173. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-866, DATA MINING: AGENCIES
HAVE TAKEN KEY STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN SELECTED EFFORTS, BUT SIGNIFICANT
COMPLIANCE ISSUES REMAIN 2 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05
866.pdf [hereinafter GAO COMPLIANCE REPORT] (federal agency data-mining projects use
data from "private sector sources (such as credit card companies)").
174. See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 59, at 9.
175. See GAO DATA MINING REPORT, supra note 65, at 2.
176. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 522a(e)(9)-(10) (2005).
177. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541-3549 (2005).
178. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies Guidance on Inter-Agency Sharing of Personal Data-Protecting Personal Privacy
(Dec. 20, 2000) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/mOl-05.html;
Guidance on Privacy Act Implications of "Call Detail" Programs to Manage Employees'
Use of the Government's Telecommunication System, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,290 (Apr. 20, 1987),
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and Technology provide guidance on compliance. 179 The GAO, however,
has found that some agencies have not met the statutory or regulatory
standards for safeguarding their data. 180 Under this Essay's thesis, these
failures would become relevant to separation of powers analysis.
CONCLUSION
Throughout American history, the Supreme Court has applied the
Constitution to changed circumstances. After 9/11, the Court must do so
again, as some battles in the war on terror threaten our constitutional
commitment to liberty and privacy. While the Bill of Rights often takes
center stage when individual liberty is threatened, we must not forget that
separation of powers-our system of checks and balances-is the first
line of defense against such incursions. Our timeless commitment to sep-
arated power must now be applied to the federal government's timely
efforts to identify terrorists and prevent their attacks. This Essay pro-
poses that separation of powers analysis look to the evolving discipline of
corporate compliance and ethics for guidance. Over the last half century,
businesses have accumulated vast expertise on checking and balancing
the exercise of private authority to protect shareholder value. The fed-
eral government ought to employ similar measures to protect our consti-
tutional values.
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/guidance-privacy-act.pdf; Responsi-
bilities for the Maintenance of Records About Individuals by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed.
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180. See GAO COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 173, at 14-15; see also U.S. GEN. Ac-
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4-5 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004_fisma-report.
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